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ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw-FREEDOM

OF INFORMATION

ACT-AGENCY

CONTINUEs-NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132
(1975); Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering
Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975).

SECRECY

Sears, Roebuck and Company brought an action under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 to compel disclosure of Advice
and Appeals Memoranda issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board.2 In ordering disclosure of both sets of
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 175) [hereinafter cited as "FOIA" or "Act"]. Pertinent portions of that Act read as follows:
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for
public inspection and copying(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well
as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted
by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a
member of the public;
unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale. To the
extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an
agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an
opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction. However, in each case the justification for the deletion shall be explained fully in writing. Each agency shall also maintain and make available for public inspection
and copying current indexes providing identifying information for the public as
to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by
this paragraph to be made available or published ...
(4)(B) On complaint, the district court of the United States ... has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In
such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the
contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or
any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its
action ...
See note 14 infra for the nine exemptions from the requirement of disclosure.
2. The NLRB is charged with the responsibility of monitoring and adjudicating
claims of unfair labor practices by unions or employers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-68 (1970).
Regional Directors initially receive such complaints, and are empowered to investigate as they find necessary. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.2, .4 (1975). The Sears opinion contains
a detailed explanation of agency procedure upon receiving a complaint. As explained
by the Court, the Regional Directors may seek the aid of the Office of the General
Counsel. If such aid is sought, the Counsel responds with an Advice Memorandum.
After the Regional Directors reach a decision, the charging parties may appeal any
adverse result to the General Counsel. The General Counsel then issues an Appeals
Memorandum, which directs either the filing of a complaint or the dismissal of the
charges. 421 U.S. at 138-42. See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.2-.8 (1970). 29 U.S.C. §
153(d) (1970) reads: "[The General Counsel] shall have final authority, on behalf of
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documents, the district court held that Advice Memoranda qualified
under the Act as " 'instructions' [to staff] which affect a member of
the public," but that Appeals Memoranda were "final opinions" which
did not fall within the Act's exemption for "intra-agency memoranda." 3 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
4
without opinion.
In another case requiring interpretation of the FOIA, Grumman
Aircraft Engineering Corporation brought suit in the same court,
seeking regional board reports 5 and division reports 6 of the Renegotiation Board.7 The district court ordered disclosure of the reports as
"final opinions." 8 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed. 9
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the cases were consolidated. Held: (1) Advice and Appeals Memoranda prepared by the
General Counsel of the NLRB directing dismissal of charges of unfair
labor practices are final opinions disclosable under the FOIA; and (2)
neither Advice and Appeals Memoranda which direct filing of complaints nor regional board and division reports of the Renegotiation
Board are final opinions of an agency within the meaning of the
FOIA, but instead are exempt from disclosure as predecisional intraagency memoranda. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132
(1975); Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering
Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975).
As this note will demonstrate, the Sears and Grumman decisions
thwart congressional intent by restricting disclosure under the FOIA.
The effect of the Supreme Court analysis is to narrow the concept of
the Board, in respect to the investigation of charges and the issuance of complaints.
. . See. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); United Elec. Contractors v. Ordman,
366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
3. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751, 754 (D.D.C. 1972).
4. 480 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
5. Regional Boards of the Renegotiation Board perform initial investigation into
defense contract profits. See note 7 infra. The Regional Board makes findings and forwards to the Renegotiation Board a decision on the propriety of the profits earned by
defense contractors. See note 29 infra.
6. The Renegotiation Board may assign cases before it to a subdivision of that
Board. known as a Division. 50 U.S.C. § 1217(e) (app. 1970). That Division may
prepare a report to be considered by the Board as a whole. See note 29 infra.
7. The Renegotiation Board is established and governed by 50 U.S.C. §§ 1211-33
(app. 1970). Its purpose is to monitor the profits made by defense contractors and to
require the refund of excess profits to the government. See note 29 infra.
8. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 325 F. Supp. 1146 (D.D.C.
1971).
9. 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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finality under the FOIA and, at the same time, to expand the applicability of the exemption for intra-agency memoranda. The Court's approach unnecessarily compromises the public's need to know the
working law of administrative agencies, thereby blunting the force of
the FOIA disclosure requirements. It is submitted that the purposes of
the FOIA would have been served more faithfully had the Court
adopted a policy of in camera review of agency documents, allowing
selective deletion of exempt material, rather than permitting blanket
protection for such documents.
I.

THE FOIA AND THE DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
The FOIA was enacted in 1966 "to establish a general philosophy

of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly
delineated statutory language . . . -10 Itwas designed to overcome
the shortcomings of its predecessor, Section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act,'1 which ironically was employed to facilitate agency
10. S.REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). See also H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966). The Senate report construction of the Act contemplates broader disclosure of information than does the House report. In areas of conflict, the courts have recognized the Senate report as the more authoritative, because
it was available for consideration by both houses while the House report was not. See,
e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Benson v. General
Servs. Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd on other
grounds,415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969).
For general analyses of the Act see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-

DURE ACT (June
CHI. L. RV. 761

1967); Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U.
(1967). The Attorney General's Memorandum tends to rely upon the
more restrictive House report, and has been criticized by courts and commentators for
its agency bias. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 800-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d
1363 (2d Cir. 1971); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3A.1, at 115 (Supp.
1970).
For a description and analysis of initial judicial interpretations see Comment, The
1966 Freedom of Information Act-Early Judicial Interpretations,44 WASH. L. REV.
641 (1969). For an updated critique see Comment, The Freedom of Information Act:
A Seven Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (1974). See also Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestionsfor Making Information Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REv. 189 (1972); Kramer & Weinberg, The Freedom of Information
Act, 63 GEO. LJ.49 (1974); Note, The Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters
of the Exemptions, 62 GEO. L.J. 177 (1973); Note, The Freedom of Information Act,
A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 150 (1969); Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1047
(1973); Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L.
REV. 971 (1975).
11. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237-44 (1946). The Senate report identified
numerous deficiencies associated with § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act:
The serious deficiencies in this present statute are obvious. They fall into four
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secrecy rather than to provide public access to government information.12 In order to overcome the infirmities of Section 3, the FOIA
provides for disclosure of several classes of documents including all
agency final opinions and orders issued under an agency's adjudicatory authority. 13 The Act sets forth nine specific exemptions to the
otherwise broad disclosure mandate of the Act, and directs that they
4
are to be narrowly construed.'
categories:
(1) There is excepted from the operation of the whole section "any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest * * *."
There is no attempt in the bill or its legislative history to delimit "in the public interest," and there is no authority granted for any review of the use of
this vague phrase by Federal officials who wish to withhold information.
(2) Although subsection (b) requires the agency to make available to
public inspection "all final opinions or orders in the adjudication of cases,"
it vitiates this command by adding the following limitation: '* * * except
those required for good cause to be held confidential* * *.'
(3) As to public records generally, subsection (c) requires their availability "to persons properly and directly concerned except information held
confidential for good cause found." This is a double-barreled loophole because not only is there the vague phrase "for good cause found," there is
also a further excuse for withholding if persons are not "properly and
directly concerned."
(4) There is no remedy in case of wrongful withholding of information
from citizens by Government officials.
S. REP. No. 813, supra note 10, at 5.
One result of Congress' effort to remedy these problems is the more detailed
description in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970) of the documents which must be disclosed
as well as the more carefully described exemptions of id. § 552(b). In addition, the
present FOIA contains no need requirement; the first line of the current Act states
simply that information is to be made "available to the public." Id. § 522(a). Thus.
the merely curious have as much right to the materials made available under the provisions of the FOIA as those with a vital interest at stake. Finally. id. § 552(a)(4)(B)
gives any member of the public a judicial remedy for wrongful withholding of administrative records by entitling the complainant to a court order compelling the respondent agency to produce the information at issue.
12. As the Senate Committee report concluded:
[T] he present section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act is of little or no
value to the public in gaining access to records of the Federal Government. Indeed, it has had precisely the opposite effect: it is cited as statutory authority
for the withholding of virtually any piece of information that an official or
agency does not wish to disclose.
S. REP. No. 813, supra note 10, at 5.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. V, 1975) lists the nine exemptions currently in
force:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
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The Supreme Court purported to recognize the broad disclosure
requirements of the FOIA in EPA v. Mink, 15 where Justice White,
the philosophical underpinnings of
speaking for the Court, identified
16
the Act in the following terms:
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of
a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of
a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by
the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures,
or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.
In addition, § 552(c) of the Act clearly indicates a congressional intent that the
nine exemptions are to be narrowly construed:
(c) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section.
This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress.
Id. § 552(c) (1970).
15. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
16. Id. at 80. Mink involved an attempt by members of Congress to compel disclosure of executive classified documents. The defendants invoked the protection of
exemption I and, alternatively, exemption 5, see note 14 infra. The lower courts
had ordered the defendants to bring the documents forward for in camera inspection,
but the Supreme Court reversed. While the Court did not declare that such inspection was always improper, it did state that requiring in camera inspection in every
case would defeat exemption 5's purpose of protecting free and frank agency discussion. 410 U.S. at 93. Thus, the documents at issue in Mink could not be reviewed
by the district court to separate disclosable and nondisclosable materials. Congress
disagreed with the Mink decision and within six weeks of the decision a bill was
introduced into the House (H.R. 4960, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)) designed to
reverse the result in Mink. See Note, The Freedom of Information Act Amendment

of 1974: An Analysis, 26 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 951, 956 n.29 (1975).
The 1974 amendments to the FOIA overrule, the Mink holding by granting the
district court discretion to enjoin an agency from withholding information and by
authorizing a de novo review of the agency refusal to disclose the material. Section
552(a)(4)(B) now explicitly provides for in camera review of agency records withheld under any of the exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) Supp. V, 1975). The
change "clarifies Congressional intent to override the Supreme Court's holding in
[Mink] with respect to in camera review of classified documents." S. REP. No. 1200,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974).
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Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public
view and attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to
secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands ...
But the Court's protection of the documents in question under exemption 1, which provides for secrecy in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy, emphasized that the manner in which the FOIA is implemented will depend largely upon the scope which judicial interpretations give to the nine specific exemptions listed in the Act.
In particular, the disclosability of many agency documents will turn
upon how narrowly the courts construe exemption 5. This exemption
provides that the FOIA disclosure provisions do not apply to "interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency. ' 17 The purpose of the exemption is to protect the agency decisionmaking process by exempting from disclosure memoranda re18
flecting predecisional opinions and exchanges.
The lower courts, particularly the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, have recognized and implemented the broad disclosure
purposes of the FOIA by restricting the reach of exemption 5 to those
situations in which the exemption clearly fulfills the specific purposes
for which it was designed. In American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick,' 9
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that internal
memoranda normally afforded protection under exemption 5 lose that
protection when an agency relies upon them or incorporates them by
reference into an agency decision. The court recognized that when a
memorandum incorporated into a final decision becomes an integral
part of that decision, the rationale of the exemption no longer applies,
and disclosure of the memorandum is required to avoid unreasonable
20
circumvention of the FOIA.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
18. See S. REP. No. 813, supra note 10, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 10,
at 10. See also note 57 and accompanying text infra.
19. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
20. See also Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in
which the court ordered the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to disclose memoranda previously prepared by the Commission for use in a prior case. Although the
memoranda were prepared prior to the final decision, the FTC issued no opinion
after the decision was made; the court believed that these prior memoranda stated
the reasons for the decision reached by the FTC. The court did rely, however, on
exemption 5 to protect memoranda prepared by individual Commission members
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Two years later the same court further clarified FOIA disclosure
requirements by distinguishing between exempt and non-exempt material contained within the same document. In Soucie v. David2 ' the
court ordered disclosure of any factual information, although opinions
and advice of agency personnel within the same memoranda were
protected by exemption 5.22 Because protection of factual material
and staff personnel. Id. at 707. See also Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (district court ordered on remand to consider whether the agency
incorporated predecisional memoranda in the final opinion); Washington Research
Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1973) ("site visit reports" prepared
by investigating staff and incorporated into final agency decision by review groups
held disclosable).
21. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Soucie, private citizens brought suit
under the FOIA against the Director of the Office of Science and Technology to
compel release of a report evaluating the federal government's program for development of supersonic transports. In remanding the case, the court suggested that
whether statutory or constitutional exemptions protected the report could be most
effectively determined by examination of the report in camera.
22. Id. at 1077-78. A more recent case, Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491
F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974), refines this fact-opinion distinction. In that case, highly
selective summaries of more than 9,000 pages of facts were prepared by staff members for the decisionmaker. The entire 9,200 pages of facts were made available by
the agency, but the agency withheld the summaries on the ground that they contained highly subjective staff evaluations of determinative issues in the case before
the agency. In upholding the right of the agency to withhold the summaries, the
court declared:
Our solution rests on the interpretation of the purpose of exemption 5. If the
exemption is intended to protect only deliberative materials, then a factual summary of evidence on the record would not be exempt from disclosure. But if
the exemption is to be interpreted to protect the agency's deliberative process,
then a factual summary prepared to aid an administrator in resolution of a
difficult, complex question would be within the scope of the exemption.
Id. at 68 (emphasis in original). The court thus concluded that protection of the
decisionmaking process was required. The summaries were protected because the
factual material was inseparable from the exercise of predecisional judgment and
discretion by staff personnel; disclosure would allow the public to probe the predecisional mental processes of agency personnel in violation of exemption 5.
See also Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
410 U.S. 73 (1973) (exemption 5 inapplicable to factual material contained within
otherwise exempt classified documents of the executive branch); Bristol-Myers Co.
v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (district court ordered on remand to evaluate materials in light of fact-opinion distinction); Rabbitt v. Department of the
Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (in camera inspection ordered to
determine whether all factual material had been released from Air Force airplane
crash report); Verrazzano Trading Corp. v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1401 (Cust.
Ct. 1972) (written data and work notes compiled during scientific examination of
fabrics must be disclosed by the agency, because they represent factual material).
Other courts have recognized the fact-opinion distinction but found it inapplicable
in the circumstances of the cases before them. See Brockway v. Department of the
Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975) (statements of witnesses in airplane crash
investigation protected under discovery rules, because facts contained therein were
not adequately separable from the exempt material); K.C. Wu v. National Endowment for the Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972) (opinions and recommendations received from outside scholars on proposed projects for grants held not dis-
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does not serve any conceivable exemption 5 purpose, the court declared that such material can be shielded "only if it is inextricably in'23
tertwined with policy-making processes.
The Soucie fact-opinion distinction was codified by the 1974
amendments to the FOIA. Section 552(b) now requires that "[a] ny
reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any
person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are
exempt under this subsection."2 4 Thus, prior to the Supreme Court
decisions in Sears and Grumman, the narrow scope of exemption 5
was well established judicially and endorsed legislatively.
II.

THE COURT'S REASONING: FINAL OPINIONS AND
EXEMPTION 5 UNDER SEARS AND GRUMMAN

In analyzing the disclosure requirements of the FOIA, the Supreme
Court began in both Sears and Grumman with a lengthy examination
of the agency decisionmaking process and the material sought in each
case. The Court recognized that "[c] rucial to the decision of this case
is an understanding of the function of the documents in issue in the
context of the administrative process which generated them."2 5 The
Act's requirement that all "final opinions" and "orders made in the
adjudication of cases" be made available to the public necessitated an
evaluation of the finality of the particular agency actions involved.
In Sears, Justice White, speaking for the Court, concluded that
under NLRB procedures2 6 the General Counsel's decision not to file a
complaint is final, because it effectively disposes of the case-the decision is not subject to review. 27 Conversely, a memorandum that directs the filing of a complaint is not, in terms of exemption 5, a " 'final
opinion' in the 'adjudication' of a 'case' because it does not effect a
'final disposition' . . . .,"28 In similar fashion, Justice White analyzed
the procedures of the Renegotiation Board29 in Grumman and conclosable); Owens v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 379 F. Supp. 547 (D.D.C.
1974) (reports and evaluations of prisoner performance, behavior, and readiness for
release not disclosable because they were assessments of facts, rather than the facts
themselves).
23. 448 F.2d at 1077-78.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
25. 421 U.S. at 138.
26. See note 2 supra.
27. 421 U.S. at 155.
28. Id. at 160.
29. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 1421 (1976). Cases are assigned to the Regional Board to
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cluded that opinions of the Regional Board are not final, because only
the official action of the entire Board truly disposes of cases. 30 The
Regional Boards and Divisions do not issue final opinions, because
they have "no legal authority to decide."13 Accordingly, only opinions
and orders which technically dispose of agency cases were considered
by the Court to be final for purposes of the FQIA. The Court's characterization of a particular document as a "final opinion" automatically precluded agency reliance on exemption 5's protection of "intraagency memoranda," because the two statutory terms were found to
32
be mutually exclusive.
In holding that exemption 5 cannot be applied to final opinions of
an agency, the Court explained the dual purposes of the FOIA exemption for "intra-agency memoranda." On the one hand, the exemption
was designed to safeguard the quality and integrity of the administrative decisionmaking process, which the Court recognized as the "executive privilege" of a governmental agency. 33 In applying the executive
privilege rationale, the Court emphasized that the confidentiality of
intra-agency exchanges would be upheld only with respect to predecisional memoranda serving a consultative function and not memoranda reflecting decisions already reached. 34 Thus the agency decisionmaking process is protected, while the product of that process is
not. Applying this analysis in Sears, the Court concluded that the
General Counsel decisions to dismiss complaints reflect the product of
agency process, because they terminate NLRB action with respect to
those complaints. 35 Decisions to file complaints, however, constitute
part of ongoing agency process and are protected. 36 The Court simiconsider the question of excess profits in defense contracts. Id. § 1422.23 1. In some
classes of cases, the Regional Board has authority to make ultimate decisions while in
others it makes only an initial determination. Id. § 1422.232-2. The Grumman case
fell into the latter category. For a detailed exposition of the renegotiation procedures
see Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 325 F. Supp. 1146, 1148-54

(1971). See also 421 U.S. 168, 170-79 (1975). It should be noted that the National
Board is not required to write opinions. Although made subject to the disclosure
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Board is exempted from all other
requirements of the APA. 50 U.S.C. § 1221 (app. 1970).

30.

421 U.S. at 184-85.

31.

Id.at 189.

32. Id. at 153-54. The Court noted: "Exemption 5 does not apply to any document which falls within the meaning of the phrase 'final opinion ... made in the
adjudication of cases.'" Id. at 148.
33. Id. at 150-54. See also S. REP. No.813, supra note 10, at 2,9; H.R.REP. No.
1497, supra note 10, at 10.
34. 421 U.S. at 149, 151-52.

35.

Id. at 155.

36.

Id.
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larly protected the Regional Board and Division Reports in Grumman
by concluding that they are predecisional memoranda within exemption 5.37
In addition to recognizing the executive privilege function served
by exemption 5, the Court noted that the exemption incorporated the
38
attorney work-product rule familiar in the civil discovery context.
Applying the work-product rule to government attorneys involved in
litigation would prevent access to memoranda "prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation which set forth the attorney's
theory of the case and his litigation strategy." 3 9 In Sears, the Court
relied primarily on the work-product aspect of exemption 5 in declining to compel disclosure of Advice and Appeals Memoranda that
direct the filing of a complaint, because the General Counsel who
makes the decision to issue the complaint must subsequently serve as
40
the litigator of the case before the NLRB.
III.

A.

IMPLEMENTING THE FOIA: A SUGGESTED
APPROACH
Defining "Orders" of "Agencies" Under the FOIA

The FOIA puts explicit limitations upon the kind of material which
is subject to its provisions. The test of disclosability is two-fold: before
an organization can be compelled to produce documents, both the
documents sought and the organization approached must qualify for
the disclosure mandates of the FOIA.
First, documents qualify for disclosure only if they are "final opinions" or "orders made in the adjudication of cases."'4 1 Although the
Act contains no specific definition of "final opinion," "order" is de37. Id. at 186.
38. The Court stated:
It is equally clear that Congress had the attorney's work-product privilege
specifically in mind when it adopted Exemption 5 ....
The Senate Report states
that Exemption 5 "would include the working papers of the agency attorney and
documents which would come within the attorney-client privilege if applied to
private parties." S. REP. No. 813. p. 2; and the case law clearly makes the attorney's work-product rule of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). applicable
to Government attorneys in litigation.
id. at 154
39. Id.
40. Id. at 159-60.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970). See note I supra.
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fined as "the whole or part of a final disposition. . . of an agency in
any matter other than rule making but including licensing. '4 2 In addition, "adjudication" is defined very broadly as "agency process for the
formulation of an order. '43 Thus, the scope of the phrase "orders
made in the adjudication of cases" is necessarily broad; any order issued as part of the process of adjudication leading to a final disposition must be disclosed. By implication, opinions accompanying those
44
orders are final and subject to disclosure.
Required disclosure under the FOIA therefore should cover a very
wide range of documents. "Finality" should not be limited to the
single ultimate disposition of the agency, as the Supreme Court opinions appear to suggest that it is. 45 The Court seems to push the finality

concept under the FOIA toward the much narrower administrative
law doctrine of finality for purposes of judicial review. 46 Yet, because
of the disparate functions that these two finality doctrines perform,
applying reviewability standards to FOIA finality provisions is unwar42. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1970).
43. Id. § 551(7).
44. The Attorney General attempted to avoid this interpretation of the Act in his
Memorandum. The Memorandum declared:
Neither the previous section 3 nor the revised section contemplates the public
availability of every "order," as the word is thus defined. The expression "orders
made in the adjudication of cases" is intended to limit the requirement to orders
which are issued as part of the final disposition of an adjudicative proceeding.
MEMORANDUM, supra note 10, at 15. Thus, the Attorney General asserted that the
phrase, "made in the adjudication of cases" substantially limits the availability of
"orders." This assertion requires a narrow reading of the term "adjudication," a
reading which the definitions in the Act clearly repudiate. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7)-(1970).
Professor Davis recognizes and highlights the fallacy of the Attorney General's
declarations:
"Order" and "adjudication" are much broader concepts under section 2 of the
APA than one not familiar with section 2 might suppose.... I think the Memorandum is clearly mistaken because section 2(d) . . . provides: "'Adjudication'
means agency process for the formulation of an order." Under the APA-definitions, every order is issued as part of the final disposition of an adjudication.
Therefore, the correct statement is precisely the opposite of what the Attorney
General says: Both the previous section 3 and the revised section contemplate
the public availability of every "order" as defined by section 2(d).
K. DAVIS, supra note 10, at § 3A.8 (emphasis added).
45. See 421 U.S. at 152 n.19.
46. The main requirement of finality for purposes of judicial review is expressed
in the traditional administrative law doctrine of exhaustion. Essentially it is a requirement that administrative law remedies be fully pursued prior to seeking judicial review. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424 (1965). The
purpose of the doctrine of exhaustion is to prevent courts from interfering with the
adjudicatory process before it is complete. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE ch. 20 (1958). Thus, reviewability is largely a matter of the completion of
the entire administrative process. The underlying policy is to recognize the autonomy
of the agency.
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ranted; the justification for the limitations which the reviewability
standard imposes is inapplicable to exemption 5.47
Secondly, governmental units are subject to the FOIA disclosure
provisions only if they qualify as "agencies." This requirement needs
little examination with regard to the Advice and Appeals Memoranda
prepared by the General Counsel; the Counsel's decision whether to
48
file a complaint is made on behalf of the agency and is unreviewable.
Defining the Regional Boards as "agencies" is somewhat more complicated, given the reviewability of its findings by the National Renegotiation Board. Nevertheless, the result of careful analysis is the
same: the Regional Boards should be considered agencies subject to
the disclosure requirements of the Act. The statutory definition of
"agency" is supplied by provisions of the original Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which remain in force: "'agency' means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency. . . .
The court of
appeals in Grumman, quoting its own opinion in Soucie,50 noted that
under this definition any " 'administrative unit with substantial authority in the exercise of specific functions' " is an agency under the
APA. 5 1 Relying on this analysis, the court refused to apply exemption
5 to the decisions of the Regional Boards, because those Boards
"serve as a discrete, decision-producing layer in the renegotiation
53
process." 52 In addition, by the terms of the Renegotiation Act,
the National Board is specifically authorized to establish agencies
and delegate functions, powers, and duties to them. 5 4 Because the
"49

47. Because the purposes of the FOIA have nothing to do with autonomy or
separation of powers, equating FOIA finality with reviewability is inappropriate.
The purpose of the FOIA involves disclosure, not review:
It is the purpose of the present bill . . . to establish a general philosophy of
full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the
press may obtain information wrongfully withheld. It is important and necessary that the present void be filled. It is essential that agency personnel. and the
courts as well, be given definitive guidelines in setting information policies.
S. REP. No. 813, supra note 10, at 3.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970). See note 2 supra.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970) (emphasis added). For the purposes of the FOIA,
the term "agency" was explained, and perhaps expanded, in id. § 552(e) (Supp. V,
1975). See note 55 infra.
50. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
51. 482 F.2d at 715.
52. Id.
53. 50U.S.C.§ 1211-33 (app. 1970).
54. The Act reads in pertinent part:
The Board may delegate in whole or in part any function, power, or duty

132

Agency Secrecy
Regional Boards are established under this authority, it is inconceivable that the "agency" label can be withheld from them. 5 5 As an
agency, each Regional Board is governed by the provisions of the

FOIA.
B.

Balancing the Interests: Confidentiality v. Disclosure

Sears and Grumman evidence the Supreme Court's view that the
FOIA applies only to memoranda which reflect ultimate administrative dispositions of cases. The main objection to the Court's decisions,
however, is the overly broad construction of exemption 5 adopted in
the effort to protect the agency decisionmaking process. Once the
Court found exemption 5 to be applicable, it extended the exemption's coverage to the entirety of the General Counsel's and Regional
Board's memoranda. This approach lacks flexibility and fails to lend
itself to the balancing of governmental and private interests required
by the FOIA. Instead, the Court extends exemption 5 far beyond its

supporting rationale.
Exemption 5 represents a deliberate congressional attempt to recognize an agency's legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of its
decisionmaking process by insulating deliberations that precede a de-

cision. 56 Granting administrative anonymity encourages more careful
[with minor exceptions] to any agency of the Government, including any . . .
agency established by the Board, and may authorize the successive redelegation,
within limits specified by it, ... to any agency of the Government, including any
agency establishedby the Board.
50 U.S.C. § 1217(d) (app. 1970) (emphasis added).
55. The Senate report on the 1974 amendments initially might appear to contradict this conclusion. It states that "it is not intended that the term 'agency' be applied
to subdivisions, offices, or units within an agency." S. REP. No. 1200, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1974). However, the amendments do not repeal any of the definitions of
"agency" contained in § 551(1). Indeed, the only changes Congress made in the
definition of agency expanded its meaning: "For purposes of this section, the term
'agency' as defined in 551(1) of this title includes any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive
Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)
(Supp. V, 1975). Indeed, the Senate report explicitly declares: "Expansion of the
definition of 'agency' in this subsection is intended to broaden the applicability of the
Freedom of Information Act ......
S. REP. No. 1200 supra, at 15. The Regional
Boards qualify as "agencies" under their own statutory basis, see note 54 supra, as
well as under the definition of "agency" for the FOIA. The divisions of the National
Board, on the other hand, probably do not meet the requirements for an agency;
they lack requisite "independent authority in the exercise of specific functions."
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
56. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra. See also S. REP. No. 813,
H.R. REP. No. 1497, supranote 10.
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and fully considered decisions, because the agencies are not inhibited
by public scrutiny during the predecisional process. 57 But protecting
the agency's interest in predecisional confidentiality does not infringe
significantly upon the public's right to know, because, as the Court
noted, "It] he public is only marginally concerned with reasons supporting a policy which an agency has rejected, or with reasons which
might have supplied, but did not supply, the basis for a policy
....
-"58 Once a decision is made, however, disclosure no longer can
59
affect the quality of a decision already reached.
It is at this point that the comparative weights of the interests involved shift dramatically. While the agency's legitimate interest in secrecy becomes negligible, the public's interest in the contents of that
decision increases sharply. Indeed, the Court recognized that "the
public is vitally concerned with the reasons which did supply the basis
for an agency policy actually adopted. These reasons, if expressed
'60
within the agency, constitute the 'working law' of the agency.
This analysis appears singularly applicable to General Counsel decisions regarding the issuance of unfair labor practice complaints.
Labor and industry alike are entitled to be apprised of the standards
used by the General Counsel in making prosecutorial decisions. Neither unions nor employers can be expected to comport effectively and
purposefully with standards which remain a mystery. 6 1 In addition,
57. "The privilege aims to protect 'free discussion' of prospective operations and
policy." Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 947
(Ct. Cl. 1958). Professor Davis has suggested that the exemption should apply only
to "papers which reflect the agency's group thinking in the process of working out its
policy and determining what its law should be." Davis, The Information Act, supra
note 10, at 797.
For other discussions of the privilege as it is embodied in the FOIA see Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972); International Paper
Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n. 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1971); Ackerley v. Ley, 420
F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969). A much cited discussion of the privilege for governmental documents in general is Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40
F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), affd sub nora., V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark. 384
F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
58. 421 U.S. at 152.
59. The Court stated:
The quality of a particular agency decision will clearly be affected by the communications received by the decisionmaker on the subject of the decision prior
to the time the decision is made. However, it is difficult to see how the quality
of a decision will be affected . . . by forced disclosure of such communications,
as long as prior communications and the ingredients of the decisionmaking
process are not disclosed. ...
Id. at 151.
60. Id. at 152-53 (emphasis added).
61. Commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with agencies' general failure
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any articulate and successful challenge to the General Counsel's actions must be based on a familiarity with the "working law" of the
agency. Identifying departures from administrative standards is impossible without access to the materials which set out the standards as
they are applied. 62 Indeed, the Sears Court acknowledged that the
General Counsel's memoranda reflect decisions with important aspects
63
of finality that significantly affect the parties charged:
We recognize that an Advice or Appeals Memorandum directing the
filing of a complaint . . . has many of the characteristics of [a final
order]. . . . [T]he memorandum does explain a decision already

reached by the General Counsel which has real operative effect-it
permits litigation before the Board ....
For much the same reasons, the Regional Board Reports of the
Renegotiation Board contain information of potential significance to
the public. The standards employed by the Regional Boards provide
essential insight into the working law of the National Board, especially in view of the National Board's prerogative to dispense with
written opinions or other explanations for its rulings. 64 As a minimum,
the memoranda of the Regional Board reflect the ultimate disposition
of the case at that level of the administrative process, 65 and any
to make the rules and policies that govern agency action publicly available. See H.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 5-6 (1962); Gardner, The Procedures by Which Informal Action Is Taken, 24 AD. L. REv. 155 (1972). Much of
the commentary in this area focuses upon the choice between rulemaking and adjudication; the NLRB in particular is often criticized for announcing rules in adjudication, a practice which minimizes public knowledge and understanding of the standards which are being employed. See Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule
Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970);
Peck, The Atrophied Rulemaking Powers of the National Labor Relations Board,
70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
62. The mechanics of obtaining judicial review of administrative action is beyond
the scope of this note. It is sufficient here to note that when the courts can discern
precedents and standards in the agency decisionmaking process, they may refuse
to sanction an unexplained departure from those standards. See, e.g., West Ohio Gas
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935); Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting,
Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974); Marco Sales Co. v. FTC, 453 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1971); A.B.C. Air Freight Co. v. CAB, 391 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1006 (1970); Transcontinental Bus Sys. Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d
466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968); Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F.2d
583 (Ist Cir. 1965); Boston & Main R.R. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 830 (D.
Mass. 1962), affd per curiam, 373 U.S. 372 (1963). In each of the above cases,
because the previous standards were identifiable the complaining party was able to
successfully challenge the departurefrom those standards.
63. 421 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added).
64. See note 29 supra.
65. See Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 713
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agency interest in their protection is unrelated to exemption 5's executive privilege pertaining to predecisional memoranda.
Yet in both Sears and Grumman the Court allowed the reach of
exemption 5 to extend to entire memoranda. The Court made no attempt to analyze the contents of the memoranda for portions that
could be made available to the public without impinging on the
agency decisionmaking process. Such wholesale concealment of
agency records ignores the public's interest in understanding the
working law of administrative bodies-an interest given substantial
66
weight by the disclosure policy of FOIA.

C.

Attorney Work-Product and Discovery

Part of exemption 5's purpose in protecting agency memoranda is
to incorporate the attorney work-product privilege applicable in civil
discovery. 67 This is important in Sears because, as the Court noted, the
General Counsel's investigation prior to filing a complaint uncovers
material later used in litigating that complaint. A strong tension exists
between the interest of disclosure and privacy. The memorandum directing the filing of a complaint will inevitably include privileged material. But because the General Counsel serves in the first instance as a
(D.C. Cir. 1973). where the court stated: "'Conceding. arguendo, that the Regional
Board report is not tantamount to a 'final opinion' of the National Board, we have
no doubt that it does represent the 'final opinion' of the Regional Board."
The practicalities of National Board procedure dictate this conclusion. When the
Regional Board decides that a clearance should be granted in the type of case at
issue here, the report is the only document in the file it forwards to the National
Board which purports to justify the Regional Board's clearance recommendations in
terms of the statutory standards the National Board is required to apply to the facts
of the case. The National Board itself acknowledges that the report is treated at the
National Board level as the Regional Board's justification of its recommendation.
Given this function, plus the formal role it is assigned in the National Board's regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 1473.2(a) (1976), and the District Court's findings, the Regional
Board report clearly occupies the same opinion status as any document produced by
a decisionmaker in an adjudicatory-like process and forwarded to a reviewing tribunal.
66. See S. REP. No. 813, H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 10. Chief Judge Bazelon
noted in Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1971), that "at the
same time that Congress sought to enhance the process of policy formulation, it was
indicated unequivocally that the purpose of the Act was to forbid secret law. It necessarily follows that opinions and statements of policy must be disclosed while memoranda drafted as part of the agency's process of formulating such policy need not."
Accord, K. DAvis, supra note 10, at § 3A.21. Because the Appeals Memoranda
reflect the decision of the General Counsel and the policy regarding the filing of
complaints, disclosure is compelled if secret law is to be avoided.
67. 421 U.S. at 154. See also notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
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neutral decisionmaker and only later as an advocate6 8 at least a por69
tion of tie memorandum presumably is nonprivileged.
Although the FOIA incorporates the civil discovery privilege into
its test of disclosability,7 0 it is important to recognize the difficulties
inherent in the application of this test to disclosure controversies
under the FOIA. Disclosability in civil discovery turns upon the concrete factual situation of each case; the need of the particular party
involved and the relevancy of the material sought are essential factors
considered. 7 ' Conversely, determinations of disclosability under the
FOIA must occur in a vacuum; neither identity nor need of the party
seeking disclosure is to be evaluated.7 2 Consequently, while discovery
in civil litigation turns on practical and immediate considerations, disclosability under the FOIA rests on abstract, theoretical ones. As the
Supreme Court has noted, discovery rules can be applied to the FOIA
only "by way of rough analogies. '73 Because evaluation under these
circumstances inevitably yields ambiguity and uncertainty, the civil
68. See note 2 supra.
69. Professor Davis notes:
I think the work product of a private attorney is something altogether different
from a basic memorandum by the legal staff of an agency which is used by the
agency as a guide in the handling of cases involving private parties. To the extent that such a memorandum states the effective law of the agency, its adoption by the agency makes it something more than the work product of the
legal staff ....
K. DAVIS, supra note 10, at § 3A.21.
70. Exemption 5 maintains the confidentiality of those documents "which would
not be available by law . .. in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)
(1970). See also S. REP. No. 813, supra note 10, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra
note 10, at 10.
71. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). As to material prepared in contemplation of trial, the
rules provide:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things [meeting
relevancy requirements] prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or
for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means ...
Id. 26(b)(3).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (Supp. V, 1975) provides that the agencies must make information available to the "public." See note 1 supra. The congressional reports
specifically state that the aim of the FOIA is to eliminate any test of need. See S.
REP. No. 813, supra note 10, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 10, at 1. See also
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 86 (1973); SterlinjDrug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 705 (1971); K. DAvis, supra
note 10, at § 3A.4.
73. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973).
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discovery analogy is not helpful in the marginal cases, in which a
workable standard is most necessary. When the issue is in doubt, the
courts must revert to analysis of the interests that the FOIA disclosure
requirements and exemptions were intended to serve. Under this analysis, at least portions of the General Counsel's memoranda should be
considered non-exempt, because neither the executive privilege nor
attorney work-product privileges embodied in exemption 5 will support protection of all the material within the memoranda.
D.

Carrying Out the FOIA: In Camera Inspection and Selective
Deletion

If the memoranda at issue in Sears contained any disclosable material, the Court's decision violates the explicit terms of the FOIA itself
and departs from established and well reasoned lower court doctrine.
In addition to the requirement that the exemptions are to be narrowly
construed,74 the 1974 amendments require disclosure of any reasonably segregable material, contained within an otherwise exempt document, which does not qualify for exemption 5 protection. 75 This is
compelling evidence of congressional determination to limit the reach
of exemption 5 to only those circumstances in which the attorney
client or executive privilege rationales for the exemption apply. The
Soucie court's fact-opinion distinction 76 is an example of the precise
and exacting application of exemption 5 which the FOIA demands;
that exemption "does not authorize an agency to throw a protective
blanket over all information by casting it in the form of an internal
77
memorandum."
To narrow the scope of exemption 5, the FOIA establishes a presumption for disclosure,7 8 thereby requiring an agency to justify any
failure to disclose. Accommodating the legitimate purposes of exemption 5 while at the same time requiring disclosure of all material not
subject to its protection necessitates in camera inspection of doubtful
documents and selective deletions of nondisclosable materials.7 9 The
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970). See note 16 supra.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. V, 1975). See also note 14 supra.
76. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
77. Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970). See note 1 supra.
79. One approach to selective deletion and in camera inspection of agency memoranda has been suggested by two NLRB employees:
[Advice and Appeals Memoranda] identify specific witnesses, contain staff cred-
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1974 amendments specifically authorize this approach.8 0
Application of in camera inspection and selective deletion to the
documents sought in Sears would operate to protect the executive
privilege and the attorney work-product character of the General
Counsel's memoranda directing the filing of a complaint, while also
furthering the public's understanding of the working law of the

NLRB.
Because the Court concedes that Advice and Appeals Memoranda
directing dismissal of complaints are disclosable, at least some portion
of memoranda directing the issuance of complaints should be also.
The requirement of disclosure should depend on the fact of the decision rather than on the decision's content. The selective deletion approach allows for more flexible enforcement of the FOIA disclosure
requirements and offers an alternative to the wholesale protection of
agency memoranda adopted by the Court.

ibility findings and detail the General Counsel's theory warranting complaint or
dismissal of the charges.
Perhaps a reasonable approach to maintaining the sensitive balance in pending
cases would be to excise from the memoranda everything but the factual findings,
legal conclusions, and relevant precedents.
Samoff & Falkin, The Freedom Of Information Act And The NLRB, 15 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. REv. 1267, 1285 (1974). This suggested standard, however, establishes a
presumption for secrecy. It specifically identifies items which should be disclosable,
and presumes protection for everything else. The FOIA explicitly requires the opposite approach: the agency must specifically identify those documents entitled to protection because of the established presumption in favor of disclosure. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a) (1970). Given this particular situation, however, the practical outcome is
substantially the same under either approach. The materials most important to the
public are among those which the authors propose to disclose.
Selective deletion is not a new concept. It has been employed routinely both prior
to and subsequent to adoption of the FOIA. The fact-opinion distinction, and the
requirement of disclosure of factual material contained within otherwise exempt
memoranda is a form of selective deletion well-established in the civil discovery context even before enactment of the FOIA. See, e.g., Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB; 291 F.2d 655
(7th Cir. 1961).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V, 1975). See note 1 supra. For cases
ordering in camera inspection in exemption 5 cases see National Cable Television
Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.
2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ackerley v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 755
(D.D.C. 1974); Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), modified in part, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Comment, In Camera Inspections Under the Freedom of Information Act, 41 U. Ci. L. REv. 557 (1974).
Even prior to the FOIA, in camera inspection was used in civil discovery proceedings to determine whether privilege attached to disputed documents. See, e.g.,
Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
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THE RAMIFICATIONS OF SEARS AND GRUMMAN:
A SUMMARY

The Supreme Court construction of the FOIA disclosure requirements detrimentally restricts the applicability of those provisions
without bringing about significant concomitant benefits. The Renegotiation Board, exempted from writing decisions, will continue to accept without comment the now secret determinations of the Regional
Boards. The General Counsel of the NLRB will continue to make
pfosecutorial decisions for that agency without providing general access to memoranda containing the reasons for such decisions. In each
case, the result will be to insulate from public scrutiny and review the
standards these agencies apply in carrying out their administrative
and adjudicative functions.
Additionally, according a blanket exemption 5 privilege to the entirety of the General Counsel's memoranda will continue to protect
non-exempt materials, merely because they are contained within the
same document as exempt material. This failure to differentiate materials subject to the executive privilege aspect of exemption 5 leads to
inflexible and overbroad application of that exemption in direct contravention of the disclosure mandates of the FOIA. The Court's analytical framework is clearly unsuited to identifying with precision the
point at which the agency's legitimate interest in protection ends and
the public interest in disclosure begins. The Court used a cleaver instead of a scalpel, severing the disclosable from the nondisclosable in
a way which is certain to maintain the confidentiality of any conceivably exempt material and, incidentally, significant non-exempt material. Without the aid of in camera inspection and selective deletion,
exemption 5 becomes a clumsy, ponderous, and inexact tool for delineating the contours of the FOIA disclosure requirements. The end
result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Sears and Grumman is that
judicial enforcement of the FOIA will err strongly on the side of protection of administrative documents.
The flexibility of the selective deletion approach specifically endorsed by the 1974 amendments to the FOIA suggests that the Court
should acknowledge and accept in camera inspection and selective
deletion as a viable alternative to blanket protection. Otherwise, the
FOIA as applied becomes little more than a parody of the FOIA as
enacted. Indeed, it begins to resemble in effect its predecessor, Section
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3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, hailing disclosure in theory
while affirmatively frustrating it in practice.
Greg Adams
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